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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Orders of the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Were the April 27,1999, Order on Motion for Review in the BeH matter 
and the August 11,1998, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Interim Order in the 
Thomas matter final orders upon which an Abstract of Award could be issued? 
Issue 2: Are interim orders awarding permanent total disability benefits pursuant to 
§ 35-l-67(6)(a) in general final orders upon which an Abstract of Award can be issued 
and from which an appeal may be taken? 
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court reviews for correctness giving no 
deference to the Utah Court of Appeals. Grand County v. Rogers. 2002 UT 25,44 P.3d 
734. 
OPINIONS OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Copies of the Utah Court of Appeals decisions issued in these two cases can be 
found in Addendums A and B of the Petitioners1 Joint Brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes and rules, of which the full text, as needed, can be found in 
Addendum C of Petitioners' Joint Brief, or Addendum A of this Brief, are determinative 
in this appeal: 
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Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-212 (1997) 
(l)(a) An abstract of any final order providing an award may be filed under this 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, in the office of the 
clerk of the district court of any county in the state. 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-59 (1979) 
An abstract of any award may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court 
of any county in the state . . . 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67 (1995) 
(6)(a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, 
unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) the commission reviews a summary of reemployment activities 
undertaken pursuant to Chapter 10, Utah Injured Worker 
Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the commission a 
reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider 
reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment or 
the employer or its insurance carrier provides the commission notice 
that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless 
otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation 
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or 
its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-10 (1988) 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any post-
hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time 
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding 
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration; 
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(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the order 
available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 (1998) 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings, 
or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, 
the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on review. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bell: 
1. On July 20,1995, Claud Bell sustained a lower back injury by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment with Harper Investments. (Bell Record 
(hereinafter "BR") vol. 5 at 31). 
2. On July 22, 1996, Mr. Bell filed an Application for Hearing seeking 
permanent total disability compensation and medical expenses. (BR vol.1 at 4-21.) 
3. On April 24, 1997, a hearing was held before the Labor Commission of 
Utah. 
4. On August 19,1998, the ALJ ruled Mr. Bell met the legal requirements for 
permanent total disability, that permanent total disability payments begin, and that the 
employer/carrier pay Mr. Bell's medical expenses. (BR vol. 1 at 331). 
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5. On September 18, 1998, the employer/carrier submitted a Motion for 
Review to the Labor Commission of Utah, requesting review of the ALJ's award of 
permanent total disability compensation to Mr. Bell. (BR vol.2 at 342-553). 
6. Seven months later, on April 27, 1999, the Labor Commission tentatively 
found permanent total disability on the part of Mr. Bell and ordered the employer/carrier 
to pay compensation to Mr. Bell. (BR vol. 2 at 565-70). However, the Order on Motion 
for Review remanded Mr. Bellfs case back to the ALJ for additional proceedings to 
determine, in part: 1) Mr. Bell's need for pain medication; 2) the application of Rule 612-
2-26 to Mr. Bell's claim for medical expenses related to his 12/97 and 8/98 surgeries; 3) a 
review of rehabilitation/reemployment activities; 4) resolution of an issue related to 
attorneys fees; and 5) the location of the jobs offered in relationship to where Mr. Bell 
worked. Finally, the Order directed the ALJ to make a "final determination" regarding 
Mr. Bell's entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. (BR vol. 2 at 568-69). 
7. The employer/carrier's counsel wrote to the Commissioner to ask if the 
Labor Commission's Order was a final order. (BR vol. 2 at 571). The Labor 
Commission of Utah replied that the Order was not a final order subject to appeal. (BR 
vol. 2 at 572). 
8. A second hearing was held before the Labor Commission on April 25, 
2000. 
9. To date, no Order, Findings of Fact, or Conclusion of Law have been 
entered pursuant to the April 2000 hearing. 
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10. Despite the fact that no final order had been issued in the case, Judge 
Donald L. George, an administrative law judge new to the case, entered an Abstract of 
Award on May 5,2000. (BR vol. 3 at 844-45). 
11. Thereafter, on May 9, 2000, the employer/carrier moved the Commission to 
set aside the Abstract of Award. (BR vol. 3 at 860-81). 
12. Before the Motion to Set Aside was decided at the Labor Commission of 
Utah, Mr. Bell docketed the Abstract of Award in the Third District Court and began 
execution proceedings against the employer. 
13. On June 5, 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Review of the Abstract of 
Award. (BR vol. 3 at 896-905) 
14. On August 29, 2000, the Labor Commission denied the Motion for Review 
of the Abstract. (BR vol. 3 at 985-89) 
15. The employer/carrier moved the district court to set aside the Abstract of 
Award and the Order for Supplemental Proceedings. (BR vol. 3 at 992-98). The 
employer/carrier's motion was denied by the district court on September 15,2000. 
16. The employer/carrier also filed a Petition for Stay with the Labor 
Commission on September 1, 2000. (BR vol. 3 at 990-91). The Labor Commission, 
however, denied the petition on the basis that the employer/carrier never sought judicial 
review of the April 27, 1999, order. (BR vol. 3 at 1015-17). 
17. The employer/carrier filed for a stay at the district court pending appeal. 
The district court granted the petition for stay. 
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18. On March 28, 2001, respondents filed a Petition for Review of Agency 
Action with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
19. On December 6, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for lack 
of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals indicated that the Commission's April 27, 1999 
Order was not a final Order. In a footnote, the Court indicated that the Abstract had been 
issued improperly. Harper Investment Inc. v. Claud Bell. 2001 UT App 371. 
Thomas: 
1. On October 15, 1994, Nellie Thomas, broke her left arm in the course and 
scope of her employment with Color Country Management d.b.a. Sizzler. (Thomas 
Record (hereinafter "TR") vol. 3 at 19-20). 
2. On May 19,1997, Ms. Thomas filed an Application for Hearing alleging 
entitlement to permanent total disability. (TR vol. 1 at 7-26). 
3. On January 6, 1998, an administrative hearing was held before Judge Sims. 
4. On August 11,1998, Judge Sims entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Interim Order tentatively finding Ms. Thomas permanently totally disabled 
and ordering payment of subsistence benefits. (TRvol. 1 at 233-237). 
5. Ms. Thomas received continuing disability benefits through February 13, 
1999. (TRvol. 2 at 512-28). 
6. A second hearing was held on March 8, 2000. 
7. On May 18,2000, Judge La Jeunesse issued an Abstract of Award based on 
the August 11, 1998 Interim Order. (TR vol. 1 at 339-347). 
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8. On June 14, 2000, Judge La Jeunesse issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, wherein he concluded on a final basis that successful 
rehabilitation of Ms. Thomas was not possible. (TR vol. 1 at 353-374). 
9. On June 16, 2000, the employer/carrier filed a Motion for Review regarding 
the Abstract of Award. (TR vol. 2 at 375-390). 
10. On July 14,2000, the employer/carrier filed a Motion for Review of the 
June 14, 2000 Order. 
11. On August 2,2000, enforcement proceedings were initiated because the 
Abstract of Award was docketed in Third District Court. 
12. On September 1,2000, the employer/carrier filed a Petition to Stay the 
Abstract of Award with the Labor Commission. (TR vol. 2 at 559-580). The Petition 
was subsequently withdrawn on October 23,2000 after the Third District Court granted a 
stay. (TR vol. 2 at 586-587). 
13. On October 31,2000, the Labor Commission entered its final Order 
denying in part the employer/carrier's July 14, 2000 Motion for Review. (TR vol. 2 at 
588-595). 
14. On November 29, 2000, the employer/carrier filed a Petition for Review 
with the Court of Appeals. 
15. On January 22, 2001, the Labor Commission indicated it would not rule on 
the June 16, 2000 Motion for Review regarding the Abstract of Award as it was moot 
since the Third District Court had granted a stay on the Abstract of Award. 
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16. On December 6, 2001, the Court of Appeals ruled, among other things, that 
the tentative finding of permanent total disability was not a final order and, therefore, the 
Abstract of Award had been improperly issued. Color Country v. Labor Commission. 
2001 UTApp 370, UTJ44-47. 
17. The employer/carrier made payment to Ms. Thomas and counsel on March 
27,2002 based on the Court of Appeals' decision and this courts subsequent denial of 
certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that tentative findings of permanent total 
disability benefits are not final orders. Harper Investment. Inc. v. Claud BelL 2001 UT 
App 371, and Color Country v. Labor Commission. 2001 UT App 370, 1fl[44-47. 
Therefore, the Labor Commission improperly issued the Abstracts of Award because 
there were no final orders as required by §34A-2-212 (1997). 
The Orders in the present cases upon which the Abstracts were issued, were not 
final because of the following: 
• The orders did not contain the mandatory appellate language required by 
§§ 63-46b-10 and 12. 
• The orders were not final pursuant to Union Pacific, as review of the orders 
would and has disrupted the adjudicative proceedings, and they were 
preliminary in nature. 
The orders did not comply with the plain language of §35-1-67(6), and 
petitioners have failed to address this issue. 
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• Finally, the Labor Commission admitted that the Orders upon which the 
Abstracts of Award were issued were not final. 
Petitioners have failed to identify any case law or statutory authority indicating that 
the Court of Appeals in any way erred in determining thai tin- /< YI/WI \V limlnip:- »l 
p n n u t i n i t loldl lui luhls \\"\ not (iihil .iiiil llu. "lit1 Abstracts were improperly issued. 
Nor have petitioners identified any case law where contrary rulings have been made. The 
Court of Appeals has consistently and uniformly applied this Court's holding in Union 
Pacific. 
I liiiotfiiiihiti I v, Ilk" ("'Mini ol A|J|M.',IIV (kvi^iuh h.i1 inidnccl y ^ 1-67 and its 
successor § 34A-2-413 unworkable because an employer/carrier cannot appeal a tentative 
award of permanent total disability, nor can an injured worker enforce such an award. 
Therefore, this Court should 1) uphold the Court of Appeal's decision that the orders at 
issue in the present cases wen. not final , ami "!} hold thai tentative findings ol iiciiiiaiii/iil 
total disability benefits in general are final orders for purposes of an appeal and 
enforcement after all appeals have been exhausted. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. T H E T E N T A T I V E FINDINGS O F P E R M A N E N T T O T A L DISABILITY A W A R D I N G 
SUBSISTENCE B E N E F I T S W E R E N O T F I N A L O R D E R S U P O N W H I C H A B S T R A C T S O F 
A W A R D C O U L D B E I S S U E D 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-212 (1997) provides that "an abstract of any final order 
providing an award may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of any 
county in the state." (Emphasis added). I his st; it til < ;: ex.} >licitlj cc mtemplates a final oi < ier, 
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final agency action, and exhaustion of administrative and appellate remedies before an 
abstract can be issued. (Although petitioners cite Sheppick v. Albertsons. 922 P.2d 769 
(Utah 1996), in support of their argument that tentative findings could be docketed in 
district court and enforced, Sheppick was governed by the predecessor to § 34A-2-212, 
§ 35-1-59 (1979), which did not require that awards for enforcement be final, and is, 
therefore, inapplicable.) 
A. There Were No Final Orders as the Orders Did Not Contain the Mandatory 
Appellate Language. 
In the cases at bar, there were no final orders at the time the Abstracts of Award 
were issued. In Bell, the ALJ entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
for a tentative finding of permanent total disability on August 19, 1998. (BR vol. 1 at 
327-35). An Order on Motion for Review was issued on April 27, 1999. The Order on 
Motion for Review did not contain the appellate language required by U.C.A. §63-46b-
12(6)(c). (BR vol. 2 at 565-70). As the Labor Commission confirmed in its May 25, 
1999 letter, the Order on Motion for Review was not a final order. (BR vol. 2 at 572). 
In Thomas, the ALJ entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for a 
tentative finding of permanent total disability on August 11, 1998. (TR. vol. 1 at 233-37). 
The Order was not a final order. It, as with the Bell Order, did not contain the standard 
appellate admonition contained in all Labor Commission final orders as required by 
statute. (See TR vol. 1 at 236). See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (6)(c)(vii) (1988). 
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Both subsection 10 and 12 simply indicate that a final order must contain the 
appellate language, or it is not a final order. In its Response brief before the Court of 
Appeals in Thomas, the Labor Commission stated the Abstract of Award 
improvidently due In Ilk lack ul apptllak lan^tagi* (Rrspondenl I abut I tnnmissionfs 
Brief at 24-26). Color Country v. Labor Commission, 2001 UT App 370, f44. This 
would apply equally to Bell. 
B. The Orders Were Not Final Pursuant to Established Case Law. 
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 I J I 10, 999 P 2d 
17, this Court outlined a three-prong test to determine whether an agency action is final: 
1. Has administrative decision making reached a stage where 
judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of 
adjudication?; 
2. Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal 
consequences flow from the agency action?; and 
3. Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary, 
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate, with regard to 
subsequent agency action? 
Id at f 16. The employer/carrier admits that the second prong of this test has been met. 
Howevei: , the OKIIM I wen: noi inul Ixvause flin did not liitcl lh< liist and Ihiicl prongs ol 
the Union Pacific test. 
1. Review of the Orders Disrupted Further Proceedings. 
Judicial review after the orders did "disrupt the orderly process of adjudication" in 
these case, lo appeal each ta^e after llii (iTitatiw; Imdin^ puts ivlidhililahon efforts and 
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thus the second hearing, on hold as occurred in Bell (although a second hearing was held 
on April 25, 2000, to date no final order has been issued). This creates a large time gap 
between the date of the tentative finding and the date of the final appeal. During that time 
the employee's medical condition could deteriorate, or improve, thus creating a need to 
rework any reemployment plan and require additional time to implement the plan if the 
appeal is unsuccessful. 
2. The Orders Were Preliminary and Intermediate. 
Because the first orders were tentative orders of permanent total disability, they 
were preliminary and intermediate with regard to subsequent agency action. The 
petitioners have conceded that additional proceedings are required. However, petitioners 
err in stating that the additional proceedings will not affect the Commission's 
determination, particularly in Bell. 
In addition, Mr. Bell's case was remanded in part for a determination on whether 
the jobs offered by his employer were reasonable, specifically whether Mr. Bell's narcotic 
usage would interfere with the jobs and whether the jobs were in a proper location. (BR 
vol. 2 at 565-70). (Petitioner overstates that the Order of Remand was only to determine 
whether Mr. Bell could be reemployed.) If the Commission determines that the jobs were 
appropriate, Mr. Bell will not have even met his so-called prima facie case of permanent 
total disability as petitioners assert. Union Pacific. 2000 UT 40, f21, 999 P.2d at 22, 
clearly states that orders remanding cases are not final as they are "preparatory, 
procedural, or intermediate, with regard to subsequent agency action." 
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If the issues entitling petitioners to benefits have not been completely decided, any 
order requiring payments would either be erroneous, or intermediate, not final. The issue 
in this case is whether petitioners are permanently and totally disabled, and that issue is 
not decided until the final 1 leai ii lg regai ciii ig tl :ie successfi ilness of the rehabilitation plan. 
Because interim orders earn, be overturned by the final order, such interim orders, 
including the ones in these cases, are not final. 
C The Orders Were Not Final Pursuant to § 35-1-67 
Utah Code Annotated § 35 1 6 7(6), TIC >w § 34A-2 41 3(6), ii n iicates thai • 
(a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability 
is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of 
reemployment activities . . . ; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the 
administrative law judge a reemployment plan 
(iii) the administrative law judge . . . holds a hearing . . . 
regarding rehabilitation.... 
(Emphasis added). However, in arguing that petitioners met their prima facie cases, they 
ignore the plain language of the statute, which states tentative findings . 
findings This ("enurl stated ' out pi imais exial in inlerpii'lnii? statutes is lo eive effect to 
the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language We need look beyond the 
plain language only if we find some ambiguity." State v. Bums. 2000 UT 56,125, 4 P.3d 
795. In this case, there is no ambiguity in the statute, nor have petitioners proffered 
contrary interpi etatioi i. ' v . . .... -
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Thus, the Orders were not final because they did not contain the mandatory 
appellate language, did not comply with the three prong test outlined in Union Pacific, did 
not comply with the finality language in § 35-1-67, and to deem them final is contrary to 
the Commission's own admissions. Because the Orders entering tentative findings of 
permanent total disability were not final orders, the Abstracts of Award entered in these 
cases did not comply with § 34A-2-212. 
II. UNWORKABILITY OF THE STATUTE 
Having said the above, and taking into consideration the entirety of the Court of 
Appeals1 decision, with which respondents disagree, respondents agree with petitioners 
that the Court of Appeals' decision has now made U.C.A. §35-1-67 and its successor, 
§ 34A-2-413, unworkable. 
Under the Court of Appeals1 ruling, an injured worker who is tentatively found 
permanently and totally disabled cannot enforce such a finding as it is not a final award. 
Thus, unless the employer/carrier voluntarily begins payment of subsistence benefits, the 
award is of no use to the injured worker. 
Likewise, an employer/carrier who disputes a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability cannot appeal the decision. Instead the employer/carrier must make one of two 
decisions. First, the employer/carrier can chose to implement a reemployment plan, 
proceed with the second hearing, and appeal after a ruling at the second hearing. 
However, the employer/carrier would technically be forced to make subsistence payments 
as part of the reemployment plan. If not, the Labor Commission, pursuant to its and the 
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Coiii I of Appeals1 decis ion, w o u l d determine at the second hearing that the reemployment 
plan was fatally f lawed and find the injured worker to be permanently and totally 
disabled. Color Country v. Labor Commiss ion . 2 0 0 1 111 A p p < '<>, JJ j The re fo re , even 
i f the employer/carriei p revai led on Ms appeal ot tin t e n u i i w liinlnifj in would I M \ T no 
m e a n s of recouping the improperly paid subsistence benefits. 
Second, the employer/carrier could determine not to implement a reemployment 
plan and request a final order under § 35-1-67 (6)(c)(iii) to appeal the decision 
immediately and stay payment of subsistence benefits I lov 'ever, if the eiiiplo) ei '"eai i iei 
were to lose 01 i its appeal it w 01 lid ha v e then waived its statutory right to implement a 
reemployment plan and any possibility of returning an injured worker to the workforce, 
which is the underlying purpose of the bifurcated hearing process. 
Based on the above complications created by the ', Appeals' decision, 
respondents urj'e llu1 Suprniu • ouillo w Ink up! **• - •»•• M,.*l neither (. : m 
the present cases w a s a final Order, ho ld that tentative findings o f permanent total 
disability, w h i c h contain the statutorily mandated appellate language and are not 
remanded on key issues , are final orders for purposes o f appeal a n d e n f o r c e m e n t once all 
appeals have been exhausted " >• , ; 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that tentative findings of permanent total 
disability benefits are not final orders. Harper Investment Inc. v. Claud Bell. 2001 11T 
App 3' 71, and Color Country v. Labor Commission, 2001 ! J I Vpp 3' 713 rheref i >re, tin ; •. 
Labor Commission improperly issued the Abstracts of Award because there were no final 
orders as required by §34A-2-212 (1997). 
The Orders upon which the Abstracts were issued, were not final because the 
orders did not contain the mandatory appellate language required by §§ 63-46b-10 and 12. 
Moreover, the orders were not final pursuant to Union Pacific, as review of the orders 
would and has disrupted the adjudicative proceedings, and they were preliminary in 
nature. In addition, the orders did not comply with the plain language of §35-1-67(6), and 
petitioners have failed to address this issue. Finally, the Labor Commission admitted that 
the Orders upon which the Abstracts of Award were issued were not final. 
Petitioners have failed to identify any case law or statutory authority indicating that 
the Court of Appeals in any way erred in determining that the tentative findings of 
permanent total disability were not final and, thus, the Abstracts were improperly issued. 
Nor have petitioners identified any case law where contrary rulings have been made. The 
Court of Appeals has consistently and uniformly applied this Court's holding in Union 
Pacific. 
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals1 decision has rendered § 35-1-67 and its 
successor § 34A-2-413 unworkable because an employer/carrier cannot appeal a tentative 
award of permanent total disability, nor can an injured worker enforce such an award. 
Therefore, although this Court should uphold the Court of Appeal's decision in that the 
orders at issue in the present cases were not final for nothing more than their lack of 
mandatory appellate language, this Court should hold that tentative findings of permanent 
16 
inal orders for purposes of an appeal and 
enforcement once all appeals have been exhausted.. 
DATED this S day of ^>^p" ., 2002. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, Mil I l\< 
& NELSON 
/CARRIE T. TAYLORS-
MARK R. SUMSION 
Attorneys for Respondent-
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35-1-59 Docketing awards in district court - Enforcing judgment 
An abstract of any award may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court 
of any county in the state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of the district 
court thereof. The time of the receipt of the abstract must be noted by him thereon and 
entered in the docket. When so filed and docketed the award shall constitute a lien from 
the time of such docketing upon the real property of the employer situated in the county, 
for a period of eight years from the date of the award unless previously satisfied. 
Execution may be issued thereon within the same time and in the same manner and with 
the same effect as if said award were a judgment of the district court. 
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the time of the injury, the county 
attorney for the county in which the applicant of the employer resides, depending on the 
district in which the final award is docketed, shall enforce the judgment when requested 
by the industrial commission. Where the action to enforce a judgment is initiated by other 
counsel, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs shall be allowed in addition to the 
award. 
(1979) 
63-46b-10 Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings - Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any 
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time required 
by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and 
issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based 
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on 
facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the 
order available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, 
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay 
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing 
interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the issues 
presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(1988) 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 (1998) 
(1) (a) If a state of the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the 
aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 20 days after the 
issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the 
statue or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be mailed to the presiding officer and to each party. 
(2) (a) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within 
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may file a 
response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the response. 
(b) The party who files a response under Subsection (2)(a) shall mail a copy 
of the response to each of the parties and to the [residing officer. 
(3) If a statute of the agency's rule require review of an order by the agency or a 
superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the order within a reasonable 
time or within the time required by statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule permit 
the parties to file briefs or other documents, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings, 
or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or 
superior agency shall issue a written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a person 
designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be 
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the 
adjudicative proceedings is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
(2001) 
